Enbridge ENB-T -3.29%decrease is further expanding its reach into the U.S. market with a US$2.55-billion deal to buy the crude oil business of Tallgrass Energy LP.
The acquisition announced Wednesday includes a 75 per cent interest in the Pony Express Pipeline, a 460,000-barrel-per-day system that connects oil from the Rockies region to Cushing, Okla., a major storage hub. It also includes a US$300 million plan to expand Pony Express to 515,000 barrels per day of capacity.
Also through the deal, Enbridge gets a 51 per cent interest in the Powder River Gateway system in Wyoming, about 8.4 million barrels of storage capacity across nine terminals and a crude marketing business.
The Tallgrass deal comes two weeks after Enbridge announced plans to buy Salt Creek Midstream’s crude oil gathering business in Texas for US$600 million.
“Both acquisitions … represent the types of opportunities that do not come along very often, and even more rarely meet our disciplined evaluation criteria,” chief executive Greg Ebel said on a conference call on Wednesday.
In a news release, Enbridge said it believes U.S. crude oil production will continue to play a critical role in meeting global energy demand for decades, and the Tallgrass deal “positions the company to lead this mission.”
The Tallgrass deal is expected to close later in 2026, subject to closing conditions that include U.S. antitrust provisions.
The acquisition was announced a day after Ebel said he plans to retire at year end, handing the reins to the current head of Enbridge’s gas utilities business, Michele Harradence.
“Our continued momentum on these strategically important transactions during a time of CEO succession reflects the strength of Enbridge’s planning, deep bench strength and execution capabilities,” Ebel told the call.
SUMMARY: Wholesale inflation re-accelerated in August, driven by energy. Headline PPI rose 0.4% MoM / 5.4% YoY, up from 0.1% and 4.8% in July. Core (ex food and energy) rose 0.2% MoM / 4.6% YoY.
What moved
Energy was the main driver: final-demand goods +1.1%; energy +4.2%. Diesel jumped 24.1% MoM (~78% YoY) and accounted for more than a third of the goods increase. Gasoline, jet fuel, and heating oil also rose. Electric utility prices fell.
Transportation and warehousing +2.3% MoM (truck freight up), which feeds into shipping costs for goods.
Food only +0.1% MoM.
Services overall +0.1%. Other hot spots in the article (airfares, hospital care, electronic components tied to AI data-center demand) fit the “broader than just oil” concern.
Why it matters PPI is an upstream input into PCE, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge (Sept. 30). Friday’s CPI is the bigger market event. Officials split: Chair Warsh said the Fed must be “confident that underlying inflation is moving” to 2% or “we have work to do.” Waller and others have said a cool CPI would support a hold next week. Headline heat is energy/geopolitics (Iran conflict, oil >$100); the open question is whether it is spreading. Core and PPI ex food/energy/trade (+0.3% MoM / 4.7% YoY) are still well above target.
Context Tariffs (including Canada) and high energy keep cost-push risk alive. Food cooling is the one soft signal for grocery prices. Political overlay: elevated prices into midterms.
Bottom line: Energy shock re-lit headline PPI. Core did not accelerate on the month, but the annual
CGI GIB-A-T +0.04%increase says it has acquired U.S. technology consulting firm Callibrity.
Financial terms of the deal, which closed Tuesday, were not immediately available.
Founded in 2007, Callibrity brings experience in financial services, insurance and manufacturing.
CGI says Callibrity adds 120 consultants and strengthens its presence in the Cincinnati market.
Vijay Srinivasan, president of U.S. commercial and state government operations at CGI, says Callibrity brings deep technical expertise, a strong consulting mindset and a culture of curiosity and collaboration.
CGI has 94,000 consultants and professionals around the world.
The White House has discussed the possibility that the Iran war could drag on past Inauguration Day in January 2029, U.S. officials told The Wall Street Journal.
The report contradicts President Donald Trump’s claim on Wednesday that the war would end immediately after the midterm elections.
WTI is approximately US$95–96/bbl as of September 9, 2026, driven mainly by escalating U.S.–Iran conflict and impaired Middle East shipping.
My base case is for the geopolitical premium to decline gradually, taking WTI toward US$80–90 by early December.
Estimated average over the next three months: US$86–92/bbl.
Futures support a declining path: October is near US$96, November US$92 and December US$89—strong backwardation.
The forecast carries unusually high uncertainty because developments around Iran, Saudi infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz outweigh normal supply-demand factors.
Key Drivers
1. Strait of Hormuz and Iran — dominant short-term driver
WTI has risen roughly 20% over the past month. The immediate cause is concern about Middle East oil production, tanker movements and attacks on regional infrastructure. WTI traded near US$95.70, while Brent moved above US$100 on September 9. Reuters
A ceasefire or material improvement in tanker traffic could remove US$10–20/bbl of risk premium relatively quickly. Damage to major Saudi or Gulf infrastructure could instead push WTI above US$110.
2. Futures curve anticipates lower prices
Contract
Approximate price, September 9
October 2026
US$95.72
November 2026
US$92.45
December 2026
US$88.96
The downward curve indicates that the market expects current shortages and geopolitical risks to ease. It does not guarantee that outcome. MarketWatch futures data
3. EIA expects supply recovery
The U.S. Energy Information Administration expects Brent to average approximately US$78/bbl in Q4 2026, based on recovering Strait of Hormuz traffic, restarted production and eventually rebuilding inventories. WTI normally trades below Brent, although the spread is unusually uncertain during shipping disruptions. U.S. EIA
My base forecast is higher than the EIA model because the current conflict remains active and December WTI futures are still close to US$89.
4. Demand and OPEC+
OPEC currently forecasts only about 0.6 million barrels per day of global demand growth in 2026, limiting fundamental support once the geopolitical premium fades. OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report
OPEC+ could support prices by delaying production increases. Conversely, increased Gulf production or weak Chinese demand would accelerate a decline.
Ceasefire, rapid supply restoration, weaker global demand and inventory rebuilding
TSX Implications
WTI level
Likely Canadian market effect
Above US$100
Strong cash flow for CNQ, SU and IMO; positive for the TSX Energy sector, but inflation and interest-rate risks rise
US$80–90
Still constructive for major producers; supports dividends and buybacks without as severe an inflation shock
Below US$70
Pressure on smaller, higher-cost producers; integrated producers and pipelines remain relatively more resilient
What Would Disprove the Base Case
WTI holds above US$100 for several weeks despite attempted supply restoration.
Strait of Hormuz traffic deteriorates rather than improves.
Verified damage materially reduces Saudi or other Gulf production.
December futures move above October futures, signalling expected shortages rather than normalization.
Conversely, a ceasefire combined with rapid inventory rebuilding could push WTI below the base range much sooner.
Base conclusion: WTI is likely to remain elevated and volatile during September, but the balance of evidence points toward US$80–90 by early December, with a three-month average around US$89/bbl.
Educational analysis only; geopolitical developments can invalidate commodity forecasts quickly.
BMO InvestorLine will introduce unlimited commission-free online trading on stocks, ETFs and options starting September 14.
Options will carry no trading commission, although the per-contract fee is being reduced rather than eliminated.
BMO is also eliminating brokerage account administration and transfer-out fees.
The strategy targets younger investors and responds to competition from Wealthsimple, Questrade and National Bank Direct Brokerage.
The immediate revenue loss appears manageable: InvestorLine represents about 9% of BMO Wealth Management revenue, while its broader value is bringing clients into banking, advisory and private-wealth services.
Strategic Impact
BMO is sacrificing transaction-fee revenue to attract more customers, increase assets under administration and deepen relationships across the bank. InvestorLine’s assets grew at a 14% compound annual rate from 2020 to 2025, with clients under 35 its fastest-growing segment.
The move is strategically positive for customer acquisition but could pressure competitors—particularly other major-bank brokerages—to lower their commissions. National Bank already offers commission-free trading, although it is Canada’s sixth-largest bank and therefore outside the Big Five.
Implications for BMO
Short term: Slightly negative for fee revenue and potentially higher technology and platform costs.
Long term: Potentially positive if BMO converts InvestorLine users into mortgage, deposit, advisory, private-banking and wealth-management clients.
Key risk: Zero commissions will not create lasting customer loyalty unless BMO’s platform, research, execution quality and customer service remain competitive.
Bottom line: This is more of a customer-acquisition and cross-selling strategy than a material near-term earnings event for BMO. It raises competitive pressure across Canadian discount brokerages but is unlikely, by itself, to materially affect BMO’s overall valuation.
2025 baseline already showed the hit. Goods exports −0.2% to $779B, imports +2.8% to $789B. U.S. exports −5.3% to −5.8%; U.S. surplus shrank from $101B to $82B. Non-U.S. exports +17% (UK gold, EU, China) did not fully replace lost U.S. volume. Export share to the U.S. fell to ~72%.
What this latest round adds
Sept 29 bans (alcohol, motorcycles, whey, molasses) are small vs $715B+ two-way goods trade. Alcohol to the U.S. was already crushed by the 50% tariff; spirits take the production/jobs hit, craft beer less so.
Canada’s CA$28B countertariffs raise input costs for manufacturers that still buy U.S. parts, appliances, metals, farm equipment.
GSA procurement exclusion is a slow bleed for Canadian IT/office suppliers, not a 2026 GDP event.
The live threat is still autos/steel/aluminum/lumber and a possible 50% auto tariff from Jan 1, 2027 — not whisky.
Macro channel
Growth: drag via lower export volumes, higher imported input prices, delayed capex. Not a recession trigger by itself if energy and USMCA-origin autos stay open.
Inflation: two-way tariffs = higher consumer and producer prices (alcohol, appliances, some food inputs). Partially offset by a weaker CAD if the Bank stays on hold.
CAD / BoC: more reason for a dovish bias if U.S. demand for Canadian goods keeps sliding; energy still the swing factor.
Labour: concentrated — spirits, some dairy ingredients, export-oriented manufacturing, logistics — not economy-wide unemployment spike.
Investment: the real cost. Rules changing every few weeks. Chamber point is correct: firms can price a 25–50% tariff; they cannot price a moving list.
Who absorbs it
Exporters to the U.S. in targeted consumer goods: margin compression or lost sales.
Importers/retailers of U.S. goods: pass-through to Canadian consumers.
Provinces with alcohol/export manufacturing exposure (ON, QC, BC, Prairies energy less directly).
Winners on paper: import-competing domestic producers and any successful EU/Asia diversion. That substitution is multi-year, not Q4.
Bottom line 2025 already priced a U.S. share loss and a wider goods deficit. This week’s bans are political escalation on a thin slice of trade. The economic damage scales with duration and whether autos/energy get pulled in. Stable high tariffs: manageable hit to GDP and a one-time price level shift. Unstable lists plus auto threat: investment freeze and a larger 2026–27 growth haircut.
COMMENTARY
Summary
The analysis is directionally strong: the latest product bans affect a narrow portion of Canada–U.S. trade; autos, steel, aluminum and lumber remain the larger macroeconomic risks.
The 2025 figures are broadly correct, but they demonstrate deterioration—not necessarily that tariffs caused the entire decline.
Canada’s counter tariffs cover approximately C$27.6 billion of U.S. imports, commonly reported as about US$20 billion. Both figures should not be presented as though they use the same currency.
One correction is important: a weaker Canadian dollar would generally increase imported inflation, not offset it.
The strongest conclusion is that persistent policy uncertainty could damage capital investment more than the currently banned products themselves.
Key Comments:
1. The 2025 baseline is accurate, but causation needs qualification
Canada’s 2025 merchandise exports declined 0.2% to approximately C$779 billion, while imports increased 2.8% to C$789 billion. Canada’s merchandise surplus with the United States fell from C$101.3 billion to C$81.6 billion. Global Affairs Canada, Statistics Canada
However, “2025 already showed the hit” is slightly too definitive. The data show the outcome, but the decline also reflected commodity prices, exchange rates, inventory movements and changing U.S. demand. Better wording:
“The 2025 trade data already showed the deterioration that tariffs and weaker U.S. demand subsequently intensified.”
Non-U.S. export growth is encouraging, but the comparison is asymmetric: a 17% increase from a smaller base cannot quickly replace even a modest decline in the much larger U.S. market.
2. The latest escalation is correctly characterized as narrow
The bans announced September 8 and effective September 29 cover selected alcohol, dairy products—including whey and some molasses—and motorcycles. They are economically small relative to the US$715.5 billion in 2025 bilateral goods trade. Reuters, USTR
Calling them “Sept. 29 bans” is understandable, but “bans effective Sept. 29” is more precise.
The claim that craft beer is less exposed than spirits is plausible, but it should be tied to actual export volumes. Without that evidence, describe exposure as likely smaller, not established.
3. Currency and inflation require correction
Counter tariffs raise Canadian prices for affected U.S. imports.
A weaker CAD makes most imported goods more expensive and therefore amplifies imported inflation.
The weaker currency may help some Canadian exporters regain price competitiveness, but this benefit depends on foreign demand and imported-input content.
The Bank of Canada therefore faces a trade-off: weaker growth supports easing, while tariff-related price increases and CAD depreciation limit its room to cut.
“Dovish bias” and “stays on hold” are not necessarily contradictory, but the distinction should be clear: dovish guidance can precede rate cuts without implying an immediate move.
4. The investment channel is the strongest part
The central argument is persuasive:
Stable tariffs can be incorporated into prices and supply-chain decisions; repeatedly changing product lists, rates and implementation dates raise the required return on investment and delay capital spending.
That channel can become larger than the direct loss of exports. It particularly affects automotive plants, integrated steel and aluminum users, machinery producers and firms deciding where to place their next North American facility.
The GSA exclusion is better described as a potentially cumulative sector-level drag. Its eventual impact depends on how many Canadian suppliers use the affected schedules, the value of their contracts and whether exclusions apply. Calling it definitively “not a 2026 GDP event” goes beyond the available evidence.
What Would Disprove the Thesis
Canadian manufacturing investment remains firm despite policy uncertainty.
Export volumes to Europe and Asia replace lost U.S. sales faster than expected.
Canadian firms rapidly substitute domestic or non-U.S. inputs without significant cost increases.
Trade negotiations produce a durable agreement before January 1, 2027.
Bottom Line
The conclusion is sound after one material correction: CAD weakness increases imported inflation while potentially supporting export competitiveness. The newest bans are more politically significant than macroeconomically large. The decisive variables remain autos, energy, metals, lumber, tariff duration and whether policy uncertainty begins freezing Canadian business investment.
Educational analysis only; figures and policy measures remain subject to revision.
otals from Global Affairs / StatCan year-end wrap; partner lines mixed BOP and customs sources — UK jump is largely gold.
Partner
Exports
Imports
Balance
Notes
All countries
779.0
789.0
−10.0
GAC Highlights; StatCan BOP deficit cited as −31.3 on a different compilation
United States
~558 (71.7% of exports)
~464 (58.8% of imports)
+81.6
Exports −5.8%; imports −2.9%; surplus down from +101.3 in 2024
United Kingdom
46.6–49.5
~10.8
+36 to +39
Gold-driven; exports +62% to +68%
China
34.4–34.9
65.2
−30 to −31
Exports +15%
European Union
~42.8
~78.2
−35
Exports +23%
Mexico
8.9–9.4
35.0–53.4
−25 to −44
Imports +12% to +20% depending on series
Japan
14.6
16.0
−1.3
Exports −3%
Germany
9.2
~19–20
deficit
Exports +35%
Netherlands
9.5
n/a in same cut
—
Exports +34%
South Korea
7.1
16.0
−8.9
Exports −7%
Rest of world (ex-US)
+17.2% y/y
+12.4% y/y
−112.9
Non-US two-way trade +14.3% to $553B
Read-through
U.S. still dominates, but export share fell to the lowest since the early 1980s (71.7–72.5% vs ~76% in 2024).
Diversification in 2025 was real on the export side (Europe/UK/China) and was not enough to offset the U.S. drop.
Canada ran a goods surplus with the U.S. and a large deficit with everyone else — same structure as prior years, wider gap.
Figures differ slightly by BOP vs customs, total vs domestic exports, and whether gold is booked to the UK. Use StatCan table 12-10-0171-01 for a full country list.
Canada has introduced and raised tariffs on $27.6 billion worth of U.S. goods, including dairy, agricultural equipment, paper, household appliances and electronics.
U.S. steel, aluminum and iron products, furniture and clothing were hit with the highest rate of 50%.
Officials from Ottawa and Washington continue to publicly trade barbs, blaming one another for the failure to reach a trade deal.
